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THE PROPOSED WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT
AND THE AMENDING POWER.
The woman suffrage amendment as proposed in the Sen-

ite joint resolution reads is follows:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."

It will be observed that this hnguage is the same as that
of the Fifteenth Amendment, with the exception that the word
"sex" is substituted for the words "'race, color or previous condition of servitude."
The joint resolution then provides that the amendment shall
become ol)erative upon ratification by the legislatures of threefourths of the States.
We may assume for the purposes of this article (and
only for those purposes) that the prohibition contained in ihis
amendment would apply to voting at elections for state officers
and United States Senators, as well as elections for members
of Congress, and we shall discuss the question .tnder consideration upon that assumption. We shall assume also that it is the
purpose of this amendment, in effect, to confer upon the women
in every. State the same right to vote which is now or may
hereafter be possessed by the men.
The first question which naturally suggests itself is-
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whether or not there is any limit to the amending power? It
is probable that it has not been generally realized that there
are any limitations upon this power, yet ev.en a cursory examination of the question will suffice to make it clear that such limitations do exist-that a certain class of amendments would be
void, because not within the limitations of the amending power.
The question is-whether the proposed woman suffrage amendment would be in that class?
Prior to the Civil War it was always the contention of one
of the geat political parties of the time that the Constitution
of the United States was the result of a compact between the
States--that it was a creation of the States themselves. On the
other hand, the contention of the Federalist Party, and the
successive parties which adopted its doctrine in that regard was,
that the Federal Government was "ordained and established"
by the people of the United States," as recited in the preamble
of the Constitution.
The Federalist view ultimately prevailed. This view was
stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the course of his great
opinion in the case of McCulloh v. Maryland, in these words:
"In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the
Constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from
the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States.
. . . It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The Convention which framed the Constitution was indeed elected by the
State Legislatures. But the instrument when it came from their
hands was a mere proposal without obligation, or pretensions to it.
It was reported to the then existing Congress of the. United States,
with a request that it might 'be submitted to a Convention of Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent AI
nd Iratificatior.' This
mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was submitted
to the people:"
The judgment thus rendered by Marshall was confirmed at
Appamattox. Whether right or wrong, it is no longer onen to
discussion in this country.
'4 Wheaton 316.
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But it follows, as the night the day, that the States, not
having created or made the Constitution, have no power to
alter or amend it by the action of their several legislatures,
or three-fourths of them, except in so far as the power so to
do has been conferred upon them by the people in the Constitution itself.
The peolple who created the Constifution. acting through a
national constitutional convention-the instrumentality through
which they ordinarily exercise their ultimate powers of sovcreign-ty-may not only amend hut also abolish the Federal Constitution, if they see fit to do so, and adopt sone other form

of government. Their power in conventions assembled, in a
legal constitutional sense, is unlimited.
On the other hand. the amending power conferred upon
the State legislatures, or three-fourths of them, is not unlimited.
What then is the scope of the power thus conferred? It
will he found in Article V of the Constitution expressed in the
following terms:
"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or on
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided. That no amendment which may be made prior
to the year x8o8 shall in any manner affect the First and Fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the First Article; and that no State
without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate."
It will be seen that we have here piactically three methods
provided for amending the Federal Constitution, which differ
from one another very radically.
The first method provides for amending by the States, or
three-fourths of them. acting through their respective State
legislatures. upon amendments proposed by Congress.
The second method provides for amendments to be made
by the people in convention assembled in their respective States
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in the same manner in which the Constitution itself was originally "ordained and established"; that is, by adopting amendMents proposed by Congress.
The third method is by .the action of a national constitutional convention called by Congress, at the instance of the
legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, in submitting
and proposing amendments for the approval of the legislatures
of three-fourths of the States. Amendments enacted by the
last-mentioned method would have the sanction of the whole
people of the Union, acting through their delegates chosen for
that express purpose, in convention assembled, even before submission to the State legislatures.
If Congress had seen fit to call a constitutional convention,
and the people had elected delegates to that convention with
the power such delegates usituily have, there could be no quesLion as to the right of such a convention to adopt such an
amendment as is proposed. Even if the people had not seen
fit to give express authority to the delegates to such a convention, it may very well be that it would have the power and
the constitutional right to submit for ratification by the States
almost any amendment it saw fit. It is hard to place limitations on the power of a constitutional convention-the people
in convention assembled-no matter what the particular purposes for which such convention is called, may have been.
Or even if Congress had seen fit to propose this amendment
for adoption by the people in conventions assembled in their
respective States, the question as to whether, when thus adopted,
it would be valid, is a different question from that which we
now have under consideration; but Congress does not employ
either of the above methods. The Senate joint resolution instead of thus submitting the proposed amendment to the people
in convention or conventions assembled, provides for submitting it for the ratification of the States, or three-fourths of them,
acting through their respective legislatures.
The question now under consideration, therefore, is-not
whether the proposed woman suffrage amendment is one which
could lawfully be adopted by the people either in the manner
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prescribed by the Constitution itself, or through the instrumentality of a national constitutional convention assembled independently of the Constitution.-but whether or not it is.
one
which the Staes, acting through their legislatures, have power
to adopt
It is manifest, of course, that the people, in "ordaining
and establishing" the Federal Constitution, did not intend to
confer upon the States, or three-fourths of them, an unlimited
power to alter or amend it. As we have already seen, Article V
of the Constitution, in conferring this amending power upon
the States, expressly forbids the enactment of any amendment
which shall deprive any State "without its consent

.

.

of

its equal suffrage in the Senate." The bearing of this express
limitation of the amending power upon the question which we
are considering will be discussed later.
But independently of this express limitation or proviso,,
there is one general implied limitation upon the power of the
States, or three-fourths of them, to amend the Constitution,
which all will admit, '-iz., no amendment could be deemed valid
which would have the effect of defeating in whole, or in part,
the primary object which the people had in view in adopting
the Constitution.
The Civil War and the subsequent repeated decisions of the
Supreme Court have finally settled the question as to what that
object was. It was to establish and create a Federal Union
which should be perpctuaL That being so, it follows inevitably that the people could not have intended to confer upon
the States the power to dcstro the Union by any enactment
under the guise of an amendment to the Federal Constitution.
But it is also settled now by the decisions of the Supreme
Court that the preservation of the respective States in their
integrity as autonomous political entities, and with independent
existence within their proper spheres, is necessary to the perpetnity of the Union; so that any amendment which would have
lhe effect of destroying a State would defeat the very purpose
which the people had in view in establishing the Constitution,
by, to that extent, destroying the Union itself.
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Moreover. it is not necessary, in order to come within this
implied limitation, that an amendment, any more than a mere
legislative act, should destroy a State entirely. It is sufficient
if it has the effect of stripping the State wholly or partially of
any power or function "necessary to its independent existence
as a State."
In the case of Lane County v. Oregon,2 the Supreme Court
had occasion to pass upon the question of the validity zvel non
of an act of Congress. under which it was claimed that the State
of Oregon was required to accept legal tender notes of the
United States in payment of State taxes. The court held that
the power to levy and collect taxes for the support of the State
government was one of those powers which was essential to
the separate and independent existence of a State. It could not
be claimed that the effect of the act of Congress in question
was entirely to take away this taxing power from the State, because, of course, the United States legal tender notes had some
value. Nevertheless, it was held that the act was void, because
it interfered with that power and undertook to restrain the
State in the free exercise thereof, the court saying:
"On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State
having its own government and endowed with all the functions
essential to separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to exist. Without the States in union there
could be no such poliical body as the United States.
"Now, to the existence of the States, themselves necessary to
the existence of the United States, the power of taxation is indispensable. It is an essential function of government . ..
If, therefore, the condition of any State in the judgment of its
Legislature, required the collection of taxes in kind-that is to
say, by the delivery to proper officers a certain proportion of products, or in gold and silver bullion, or in gold or silver coin-it is
not easy to see upon what principle the National Legislature can
interfere with the exercise, to that end, of this power, original in
the States and never as yet surrendered."
Again, in the case of Collector v. Day." it was held that
the right and power to establish and maintain a judiciary was
'7 Wall. 71.
'II Wail. 113.
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one of the functions essential to the independent existence of a
State as such. That although Section 8 of Article t of the
Constitution confers upon Congress in the broadest terms the*power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States,"
and nowhere expressly forbiLs Congress in the exercise of this
taxing power to tax the salary of a State official, yet that such
an act of Congress was void, for the reason that it came within
the implied limitation upon the taxing power; that it should
not be used in effect, to destroy a State by interfering with the
exercise "by that State. even in a small degree, of one of the
powers essential to its existence as a State.
In delivering the opinion of the court in that case, Mr.
Justice Nelson discusses -' the necessary limitations of the taxing
power in a manner which would seem to be equally applicable
to the amending power, as follows:
"The cases of McCulloh v. Maryland (4 Wheaton 316), and
W'Vcston v. Charles (2 Peters 449), were referred to as settling the
principle that governed the case, namely, that the State governments
can not lay a tax upon the constitutional means employed by the
Government of the Union to execute its constitutional powers.
-The soundness of this principle is happily illustrated by the
Chief Justice in McCidloh v. Maryland. 'If the States,' he observed,
"may tax one instrument employed by the Government in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every instrument.' They
may tax the mint. They may tax patent rights. They may tax
judicial process. They may tax all the means employed by the Government to an extent which would defeat all the ends of government.
""This,' he observes. 'was not intended by the American people.
They did not design to make their Government dependent on the
State. [And it must be equally true that the American people did
not design to make any of the States dependent for their existence
as Republics-as States with a republican form of governmentupon the will of any particular number of States.] And, again:
'That the power of taxing it (the bank) by the State may be
exercised so far as to destroy it is too obvious to be denied.
: * I If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right which
in its nature acknowledges no limit.'"
"Page z23.
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This reasoning is equally applicable to the proposed woman
suffrage amendment. That the right of a State to determine
for itself who s;hall constitute its electorate-who shall vote at
State elections-is one of the powers "essential to the existence of
a State" would seem to be self-evident. If any outside power
has the right to regulate or control the right to vote at State
elections in one respect, it has the right to regulate or control
it in others. If it has a right to say that women shall vote at
State elections, it would equally have the right to say that men
should not vote. It would equally have the right to say that
only children or that only certain classes of men having certain
lolitical or religious opinions should vote, or that only one or
two men should vote.
Upon the principles announced in the opinion just quoted
from, it would seem to be clear that the proposed amendment
would have to be regarded as a recoglition of the right of threefourths of the States to restrain at least or hamper in its exercise one of the functions essential to the very existence of a
State within the ileaning of the Constitution, and therefore
void.
Quoting further from the same opinion:
"Upon looking into the Constitution it will be found that but a
few of the articles in that instrument could be carried into practical
effect without the existence of the States.
-The Constitution guarantees to the States a republican form
of government and protects each against invasion or domestic violence. Such being the separate and independent condition of the
States in our complex system, as recognized by the Constitution,
and the existence of which is so indispensable that without them
the General Government itself would disappearfro-i the family of
nations, it would seem to follow as a reasonable, if not necessary,
consequence that the means and instrumentalities employed for
carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving
their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the Constitution should be left free and unimpaired, should not be liable to be crippled, much less defeated by
the taxing power of another government, which power acknowledges no limits but the will of the legislative body imposing the tax.
. . . Vithout this power and the exercise of it. we riskonothing
in caving that no one of the States under the form of government

PROPOSED 1'O3L4N SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT

guaranteed by the Constitution could long preserve its existence.
A despotic government mightV!
"It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits the General Government from taxing the
means and instrumentalities of the States, nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities of that
Government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary
implication and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation, as
any government whose means employed in conducting its operalions, if subject to the control of another and distinct government,
cn erist only at the mercy of that go vernment. Of what avail
are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?"
Now, applying this reasoning to the question in ha-md, it is
submitted that if the right to tax is "a right which in its nature
acknowledges no limits," so the right to extend or limit the
elective franchise in a State is equally a right which in its nature
acknowledges no limits. If three-fourths of the States have
the right under the amending power, or under the pretense of
exercising the amending power, to say that a State shall not
deny or abridge the right to vote at State elections to any person
on account of his or her sex. they have an equal right to say
that a State shall deny to such person the right to vote on account
of sex. They have a right, as already suggested, to forbid men
or grown persons of either sex to vote altogether; they have a
right to say that only Indians shall vote in Oklahoma; they
have a right to say that only Japanese or Chinese shall vote in
California; they have a right to say that only Scotch Presbyterians or Irish Catholics or Hebrews or Episcopalians shall
vote in New York. Clearly. the power that has -a right to
determine all this is the State, since it has the power to elect
public officials, the instruments through which the powers of
the State are exercised in the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the government. When the French monarch
made the historic boast, "I am the state," lie spoke the truth,
because lie stated a fact which none could deny. His will was
law. and he determined who should fill all the offices of government. Therefore he was the state.
'Pages

x24-T26.
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It is true that there is no express provision in the Constitution forbidding three-fourths of the States from interfering
with the control of any State of its own electorate. But, as was
said by the Supreme Court in the case from which we have
been quoting, in denying the power of the Federal Government
to tax the means and instrumentalities of the governments of
the States. the exemption from such interference "rests upon
necessary implication and is upheld by the great law of selfpreservation," as any government whose power to control its
own elections is subject to the control of another distinct government and authority "can exist only at the mercy of the latter."
In McCidloh v. Maryland,6 Chief Justice Marshall said
"that the power to tax involves the power to destroy," and
while the tax in question did not, as a matter of fact. destroy
the United States bank, the law imposing the tax was held to
be void because of its violation of the immunity which the bank
as an instrumentality of the Federal Government possessed
against even the beginning of such destruction. In other words,
for all practical purposes any government which has lost the
power and the constitutional-legal-right to protect itself from
destruction at the hands of another government or other outside
authority is regarded as having been destroyed as an independent
political entity.
Again, the very language of Article V, in conferring the
amending power upon the States, contemplated, necessarily, the
continued existence of the States. Once destroy or change the
essential character of the States, or any one of them, and there
will no longer be any means of amending the Constitution in
the manner provided for in the Constitution itself.
That does not mean, of course, that the people of the United
States have surrendered the right which all free people possess
of changing their form of government whenever they see fit
to do so. It does not mean that the people of the United States
may not, through their representatives in national constitutional
'conventions assembled, make any change in the Constitution they
' Note i, s4upra.
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see fit. Such a convention is, in a legal sense, omnipotent.

It

could change tile government from a federal republic to an
absolute autocracy. It could abolish all States and State legislatures. It could adopt an amendment abolishing the Senate and
the House of Representatives, as well as the State legislatures.
The time may come when, if democracy does not prove itself
adequately efficient to protect the people against anarchy or
foreign invasion. they may adopt some such form of governinent. but nobody will pretend that the State legislatures have
anIV constitutional power or authority to do so.
Next to the case of Lane County v. Oregon, from which
quotations have been given, came the great case of Te.ras v.
It'hite.5 That case turned upon the question as to whether
Texas, after its admitted separation from the Union, was still
a State, and required an examination of the question as to what
constitutes a "State" within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. in the course of which examination, the Supreme Court
said:
-If, therefore, it is true that the State of Texas was not at
the time of filing this bill, or is not now, one of the United States,
we have no jurisdiction of this suit, and it is our duty to dismiss
it." 9
..Some not unimportant aid, however, in ascertaining the true
sense of the Constitution may be derived from considering what
is the correct idea of a State apart from any union or confederation
with other States. The poverty of language often compels the
employment of terms in quite different specifications: and of this
hardly any example more signal is to be found than in the use of
the word we are now considering. It would serve no useful purpose
10 attempt an enumeration of all the various senses in which it is
uied. A few only need be noticed.
"It describes sometimes a people or community of individuals
united more or less closely in political relations inhabiting temporarily or permanently the same country, often it denotes only the
i,-hitrv or territorial region inhabited by such a community; not
infrequently it is applied to the Government under which the people
live. at other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory. and government
'Note 2, supra.

*7 Wall 700.
* Page 719.
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'It is not difficult to see that in all these senses the primary
conception is that of a people or community. The people in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and
whether organized under a regular government or -united by looser
and less definite relations constitute the State.
In the Constitution the term state most frequently expressed
the combined idea, just noticed, of people, territory, and governinent. A state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a
political community of free citizens occupying a territory of defined
boundaries and organized under a government sanctioned and
limited by a written constitution and established by the conscnt of
the governed. It is the union of such states under a common constitution which forms the distinct and greater political unit which
that constitution designates as the United States and makes of the
people and states which compose it one people and one country." "
"The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and
arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies and grew out of
common origin: mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar
interests, and geographical relations.
It was confirmed and
strengthened by the necessities of war and received definite form
and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By
these the Union was solenily declared to *be perpetual! And when
these articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the
country the Constitution was ordained 'to form a more perfect
Union.' It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more
clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual union made more perfect, is not?
"'ut
the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no
means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of
the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of
Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence. and every power. jurisdiction, and right not expressly
delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though
the powers of the States were much restricted still, all powers not
delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the States are
preserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. And we
have already had occasion to remark at this term, that 'the people
of each State compose a State, having its own government, and
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,' and that 'without the States in union there
would be no such political body as the United States? Not only
therefore can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States through their union under the Constitution,
but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the
States and the maintenance of their governments are as much within
" Pages 720-721.
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the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution in all of its provisions looks to an indestructible Union
composed of indestructible States." I"

How can it be said that the people intended to establish a
perpetual Union and at the same time-in the same breaththat thev intended to confer upon any number of States the
right to destroy it?
But it would seem to be hardly necessary to resort to the
theory of implied limitations upon the amending power in order
to demonstrate the invalidity of the proposed woman suffrage
amendment. at any rate. so far as such an amendment would
apply to election, of United States Senators. in view of the
express limitatimn to the effect that "no State without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." To
quote again from the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case
:
of Texas v. II'hite:
**A State in the ordinary sense of the Constitution is a political
community of free citizens occupying territory of defined boundaries
and organized under a Government sanctioned and limited by a
written Constitution and established by consent of the governed."
It is such States that constitute the United States. It is
-uch States that are guaranteed by this proviso perpetutl "equal
suffrage in the Senate." That guaranty is necessarily equivalent to a guaranty that they shall continue to be such States,
States sovereign within their proper sphere of political power.
How could the people of Oregon, for example, be said to
lie any longer a *'political community of free citizens," with "a
government established by the consent of the governed," if
,'i!hoiut their conscnt-by an act of Congress and an anendnient adopted by other StateS-nough Chinese or Japanese were
directly or indirectly enfranchised within its borders completely
to dominate its State government? Or suppose an "amendment"
were adopted conferring the right of suffrage at State elections
or senatorial elections upon women in Oregon and taking it
" Pages 724-725.

'-Note

8. supra.
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away from men, or conferring it upon Asiatics and taking it
away from the Caucasian element, would that be a fulfillment
of the guaranty that Oregon should never he deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate? Would a "State" thus constituted or re-constituted against its will be the same Oregon which
had been guaranteed forever equal suffrage in the Senate?
Again, what is a "'x)litical community of free citizens.
What constitutes a "State"? Clearly it is those people in the
State who have and exercise the political power-they constitute the State. In other words, it is the electorate that for all
political purposes constitutes the State-it and such other persons
as it nay from time to time voluntarily admit to participate
with it in the political power, i. e., the suffrage. Whenever
the electorate is forccd against its will to admit others to participate in the exercise of the pvowers of government the result
is an entirely new State and not the State which was guaranteed perpetual, equal representation in the United States
Senate by the constitutional provisions already mentioned.
It may le suggested-in fact, it has been suggested-that
this argument might be cited against the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment also, or that lortion of it which undertakes
it) determine who shall be citizens of a State by declaring them
".all persons born in the United States or within the jurisdiction
thereof shall be citizens of the United States and of the State
in which they reside."
But it seems clear that no such argunent can be maintained. The citizenship of a State may be
added to or taken from by an outside power; but so long as
the new citizens are not given by that outside power the right
to vote at State elections or the right to participate in the
election of those who are to exercise for the State its right of
equal suffrage in the Senate." the autonomy of that State is
not affected in the slightest degree. Neither is its constitutional guaranty of equal suffrage in the Senate affected.
But it may be said, and doubtless will be, by lawyers familiar with decisions of the Supreme Court, that whatever force
there might otherwise be in the arguments above set forth against
the validity of the proposed woman suffrage amendment, has
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been taken away by the decision of the Supreme Court in the
recent case of .Mycrs v.Andcrson,"' in which by .necessary implication, though not in express terms, the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment, or at any rate, its existence as a part of the
Constitution, was recognized.
Due regard for candor requires the admission that such a
contention is not easily answered, and yet it is submitted that
this contention, i.e., that Myers v. Anderson must be deemed
to be conclusive authority in favor of the constitutional validity
of the proposed woman suffrage amendment, is answered by
the following considerations among others:
There is not a word inthe opinion of the court in that case
to indicate that the court was consciously passing upon any
non of the Fifteenth Amendsuch question as the validity -'el
inent. With the exception of one or two more or less technical
points, the opinion is devoted entirely to a discussion of the
question as to whether or not the so-called "grandfather clause"
in the registration law of the city of Annapolis was or was not
in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment. Yet nany of the
considerations which have been suggested in this article were

urged against the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment by counsel in that case.
The case was argued, as appears from the report, and submitted on October 17, 1913. It was held under consideration
-by the court and not decided until June 21, 191 5 , a period of
more than nineteen months; whereas the Supreme Court usually
decides cases within a few weeks after oral argument. That
the questions involved were, during that long period, thoroughly
con-idered and debated by the learned justices of that court
cannot admit of doubt, yet in the opinion nothing was said
about the main defense which had been set up. If the court
had been perfectly satisfied that the contention made against
the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment to the effect that it
was not within the amending power, etc., was unsound, it would
scarcely have failed to say so. and put such question at rest.
13238 U. S. 368.
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The court, of course, knew that failure to do so in its opinion
would have the effect of leaving the general question unsettledopen for further consideration by the legal profession.
It will scarcely be maintained that the court deemed
the arguments against the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment
to be so lacking in merit as not to be entitled to a reasoned
answer. Arguments of the same character had been made by
some of the ablest lawyers in the United States. For instance,
in the course of his argument against the Senate joint resolution submitting the woman suffrage amendment, Senator Borah,
of Idaho (although representing a woman suffrage State), with
characteristic courage had said:
"I cannot conceive of a State, or anything of sufficient dignity
to be called a State, which has lost the right to say who shall vote
for its State officers." '
Also, Senator Salisbury, of Delaware, in the course of his
argument during the debate on the passage of the resolution
submitting the Fifteenth Amendment, had spoken as follows:
"If two-thirds of Congress were to propose an amendment,
and three-fourths of the States were to ratify it, to blot out the
State of Rhode Island and the State of Delaware, two of the
smallest States in the Union, could you legitimately do so? Would
it be a legitimate exercise of the power of amendment to destroy
the members composing the Federal Union, to destroy the parties
to the Federal Union? I presume that it will not be contended as
possible.
"What is the difference when two-thirds of 'the States propose
and three-fourths of the States ratify what they call an amendment
which deprives the States of Delaware and Rhode Island of the
exercise of authority within their own limits? .
.
"It is a perfectly legitimate mode of testing the soundness of
a principle by carrying it out to its logical conclusions. If you
have the authority to say who shall vote in a State, you have the
authority to say who shall not vote in a State. If you have the
authority to*say who shall not vote in a State, you have the authority to say that no one shall vote in a State. . . . If you
have that authority, you have the authority to say what shall be
the law of that State: how that law shall be enacted; by whom the
functions of government shall be exercised."
It will not be easily supposed that the Supreme Court did
" Congressional Record, March

20, 1914, page 5561.
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not give this question serious consideration. \Vhy then did that
court, after nineteen months of deliberation, refrain from noticing it?

Of course, no one but the court itself can answer that

question with certainty, but there is an answer which naturally
suggests itself to the mind of any lawyer familiar with the
habits and established practice of that court and that answer
is this:
The court may not have c(insidered that the validity of
the Fifteenth Amendment was open for consideration or adjudication by it, because of the fact-the overpowering factthat for forty-five years it had been accepted and acquiesced in
as valid by all the departments of the Government. in every
State of the Union and by the people as a whole without question. If it took this view, the court was only acting in accordanice with the policy whichit had frequently observed in dealing
with the question of the constitutional validity of acts of Congress where the question was a debatable one. For instance,
in the case of McCulloh v. Maryland, already quoted,1 5 Chief
Justice Marshall says:"0
"The first question made in the cause is-has Congress power
to incorporate a bank? It has been truly said, that this can scarcely
be considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the
former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now
contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has
been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been
acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy,
as a law of undoubted obligation.
"It will not be denied, that a bold and daring usurpation might
be resisted, after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than
this. But it is conceived, that a doubtful question, one on which
human reason may pause, and the human jtdgment be suspended,

in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not
concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at
rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by the legislative acts, on the faith
of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be
lightly disregarded."
"Note i, supra.
"'Page 400.
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It may very well lie that the Supreme Court felt compelled.
in consideration of the principle thus announced by Chief Justice Marshall, and other cognate considerations, to regard the
question of the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment as settledpractically not open to review by the judicial department of the
Government-and therefore did not deem itself justified in
passing upon the general question as to the scope and extent of
the amending power conferred upon legislatures of the States,
and hence allowed it to pass sub silentio.
If the proposed woman suffrage amendment should at any
time in the future come before the Supreme Court without the
sanction of any convention or conventions of the people-with
only the endorsement of State legislatures-it is difficult to see
how that tribunal could hold it to be valid.
It will be argued, of course, especially by those who are
unable to rid their minds of the delusion that in determining
the meaning, operation and effect of the provisions of the constitution of an empire, the courts are confined to the rules applicable to the interpretation of an ordinary deed or business
contract between individuals. that the Constitution does not, in
terms, accord any greater sanction to an amendment which has
been considered. approved, and submitted by a national constitutional convention, or which has been submitted to and ratified by constitutional conventions assembled in the various States
for the express purpose of considering it, than it accords to an
amendment which has received only the ratification of State
legislatures.
When a court which is charged with the tremendous responsibility of adjudicating controversies between sovereign
States. and the still more responsible duty of determining the
respective powers of State and National Governments, has before it a question, the decision of which may determine the

course of future history-when the "fate of men and empires"
may wait upon its judgment, it is not to be assumed that it will
readily yield to such an argument.-,
"It is not intended to suggest, of course, that the Supreme Court would
hesitate to declare an amendment void, even though it had received the
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Perhaps the gravity of the question which will be prcsented
to the courts in the event of the adoption of the proposed woman
suffrage amendment has never been shown in a more striking
manner than in a letter addressed by Hon. Elihu Root to the
National Convention of the National Association Opposed to
Woman Suffrage held at Vashington, D. C., December 7, 1916.
This letter, while not purporting in any way to be an argument
on the question of the constitutional validity of the proposed
amendment, presents, with the lucidity which always characterizes the utterances of that great lawyer, some of the considerations which the court will necessarily have to take into account
if the question ever arises. For instance, Mr. Root says:
"If the people of the State of New York were to vote for
Woman Suffrage I should think they had made a mistake, but a
mistake which they had a right to make-one of those mistakes
which are inevitable in the process of developing free selfgovernment. If,however, some other State or combination of
States, acquires the power to compel and does compel the State
of New York, against its will, to employ Woman Suffrage in
carrying on its government, that is no step in the exercise of selfgovernment. It is pro tanto a destruction of the right of selfgovernment and a subjection of the people of New York to the
government of others. That is what the proposed Amendment seeks
to accomplish. Having failed to secure the assent to Woman Suffrage of such States as South Dakota and West Virginia and Ohio
and New York and Pennsylvania, the advocates of Woman Suffrage now seek to compel such States to accept it against their
will and to compel them to carry on their local government and
select their representatives in the National Government in conformuity to the opinions of the people of other States who are in
favor of Woman Suffrage. I think such an attempt is contrary
to the principles of liberty upon which the American Union was
established and without which it cannot endure. Our system of
government rests upon direct allegiance and loyalty to the nation,
composed of all the people of all the States, and the power of the
nation as a whole to control and require obedience in all things
national, and also upon the idea of absolute liberty to the people
of each separate State to govern themselves in all their local affairs
according to their own free opinions and will. Without assurance
approval of constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the States, if it
were clearly not within the amending power. Neither is it intended to concede that the proposed Woman's Suffrage Amendment would be valid, even
though adopted in that manner.
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that both of these ideas, the principle of nationality and the principle of local self-government, would be preserved, the Union would
not have been formed and without them it "cannot be maintained.
Without the power of the nation we should become the prey of
external aggression and internal dissension. Without the right of
local self-government we should lose the better part of our liberty,
the liberty to order our own lives in our homes and our own communities according to our consciences and our opinions and to be
governed only, in matters not national, by officers chosen by ourselves in such ways as we consider suited to our conditions. This
country is so vast, the difference in climate, in physical characteristics, in capacity for production, in predominant industriies, and in
the resultant habits of living and thinking, are so great that there
are necessarily wide differences of view as to the conduct of life,
and to subject any section of the country in its local affairs to the
dictation of the vast multitude of voters living in other parts of the
country would create a condition of intolerable tyranny, and to use
the power of the nation to bring about that condition would be
to make the nation an instrument of tyranny. It is needless to
argue that this would ultinately destroy the nation. It is free
adjustment of the separate parts of our country, the unchecked
opportunity of each community to live in its own home according
to its own opinions and wishes, that has made it possible for us
all to unite in maintaining the power of the nation for all national
purposes. If you destroy that free adjustment by enabling some
parts of the country to coerce other parts of the country in their
local affairs by the use of national power, you will destroy the
whole system and ultimately break up the Union. That is precisely
what this Amendment undertakes to do.
"There is nothing more essentially and vitally local to a comimunity than the way in which it shall select the officers who are to
govern it. Any external power which can control that, can control
the local government. Nothing is more clear in the Constitution
under which our Union was formed than that this is a matter of
purely local concern. The one exercise of national power over
suffrage to prevent discrimination against the black race was made
and justified only upon the same grounds which justified the war
and the Emancipation Proclamation and for the time being destroyed
all local government in the seceding States. It establishes no precedent and justifies no attempt at control upon a less terrible and
compelling cause."
Action taken in the midst of the fiery excitement of the
Civil War. even judicial action, can never be recognized by sane
men as constituting a precedent binding upon the judgment of
the courts after that excitement and the occasion for it has
passed away.
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The unshakable firmness with which the Supreme Court
of the United States held the balance of the Constitution, while
the passions of the war were still far from having entirely
faded, in a series of decisions regarding the legislation enacted
by Congress during the so-called Reconstruction Period, affords
the best guaranty I)erhaps that the country could have that
that balance will still be maintained by a court having power
to declare even a constitutional amendment to be unauthorized
and void. In so doing, the court would only be discharging
the greatest of its many great functions.
Wi'm. L. Marbury.
Baltimore.

